

Roles, Rousseau, and Respect for Persons

Abstract: Why does respect for persons involve accepting that persons have responsibilities, and not just authority, for their lives and interactions? I show how we can answer this question with a role-based view: respect for persons is an attitude of recognizing others for a social role they occupy. To fill in a role-based view, we need to describe the practice into which the pertinent role figures. To do this, my account draws on the Rousseauian idea of inflamed amour-propre. Roughly, respect for persons is an attitude of recognizing persons for the role they occupy in a social practice that helps solve the problem of inflamed amour-propre.

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1. Respect for persons is a form of recognition respect, at least if we have in mind the morally important attitude of regard that we think is equally due all persons. (Darwall 1977; 2006) This is to say that respect for persons involves granting each person consideration simply because they are a certain kind of being – they have certain traits, capacities, and/or functions. Respect for persons thus is not given according to how well persons do along the various measures of human goodness or excellence. But the category of recognition respect for persons is very broad; it includes all forms of respect by which we accord some intrinsic significance to the various aspects of personhood. Which of these attitudes count(s) as the morally central attitude of respect for persons? Answering this question is important if we want an account of respect for persons that is of use for moral theorizing about how we ought to treat one another. For, different forms of recognition respect for persons suggest different moral constraints on our treatment of one another.

My aim here is twofold: (1) to pinpoint a form of recognition respect for persons that accounts for an underexplored feature of respect for persons: the fact that it involves taking persons to have responsibilities (or duties), and not just authority (or rights), for their lives and interactions with one another, and (2) to begin exploring how this attitude realizes some more familiar features of respect for persons and, relatedly, how it compares to some prevailing depictions of respect for persons.

Here is how I will proceed. I first show how our everyday experiences of respect for persons reveal that it involves taking others to be responsible for making decisions about their lives and interactions with one another.¹ I then explain how we can readily account for this feature of respect for persons in terms of role-based recognition respect – recognizing someone for a social role they occupy. Social roles are defined by responsibilities and corresponding forms of authority situated within social practices. This means that a role-based view must include a conception of the social practice that contains the pertinent role and extends to all persons. I propose that the role recognized by respect for persons figures into a social practice dedicated to solving the Rousseauian problem of “inflamed amour-propre” – the problem of avoiding social conditions that make persons anxious about being well-regarded and, as a result, desire to dominate one another. Since all persons share this problem, all persons should occupy a role in the practice dedicated to solving this problem.

That “should” poses a problem for my view and, for that matter, any role-based view. Given that social practices are contingent and artificial, a role-based view seems to ignore some familiar, central features of respect for persons, such as the fact that all persons non-contingently deserve to be respected as persons, but I argue that these worries underestimate the resources of my view. I conclude by briefly comparing my role-based view to the prevailing “capacity-based” view of respect for persons (many versions of which are Kantian). The capacity-based view casts respect for persons as the recognition of persons for their special agential capacities, such as rationality and autonomy.² In light of this comparison, I suggest that we should take seriously my role-based view as a viable alternative to the capacity-based view.

¹ Many philosophers do claim that respect for persons involves taking others to be “answerable” and/or “accountable”; see, e.g., (Darwall 2006) and (Helm 2017). But as I discuss below, the responsibilities we attribute to those we respect as persons are not fully captured by the notions of answerability or accountability.

² Following a distinction commonly drawn in the philosophy of emotions literature, I think of someone’s role or capacities as the formal object of respect for persons – the property in virtue of which individuals are a fitting object of respect for persons – whereas persons themselves are the particular objects of the attitude.

2. Our everyday experiences of respect for persons support the idea that this attitude involves taking others to be responsible for making decisions about their lives and interactions. To see why, and what this idea entails, consider a case that illustrates the characteristic non-paternalism of respect for persons: Suppose that your friend is in a romantic relationship that is very bad for him, and you have tried for months to persuade him to end the relationship. He has dug in his heels and now demands that you mind your own business. If you respect your friend as a person, you will pay some heed to his demand, even though it is against his interests (and even if you ultimately decide to violate his demand).^{3 4}

What immediately follows is the common claim that, when we respect someone as a person, we take them to have some authority to oversee their own lives. But we should not stop there. Imagine that, instead of digging in his heels and insisting that you mind your own business, your friend was in a state of perpetual, waffling indecision about his relationship. He has continually tried to offload the decision of whether to end the relationship on to others, including you. It seems clear that, in this version of the case, respect for persons clearly rules out happily and quickly accepting your friend's delegation of this important decision to you, just as clearly as it ruled out ignoring his demand that you mind your business in the initial version of the case. Respect for persons requires taking your friend to be responsible for making this decision (even if you ultimately decide to intervene).⁵ This suggests that when we respect someone as a person, we regard them not simply as having authority to oversee their life, but also as being responsible (and to a limited extent, answerable⁶) for doing so. While they can seek input and advice from others, we assume that they must not habitually or automatically defer important decisions about their life to others.

³ As Thomas Hill Jr. (1991: 49) points out, we do not suppose that this deference of respect for persons is unconditional.

⁴ I assume paternalism (of the sort incompatible with respect for persons) is motivated by its object's interests. (Fox 2019)

⁵ By "responsible," I have in mind the broad, everyday notion according to which, e.g., judges are responsible for conducting orderly trials – it's their job. On the role-based interpretation of this notion, see (Hardimon 1994).

⁶ Andrea Westlund (2003; 2008) helpfully develops the idea of being answerable for how one oversees one's life.

Consider now a second case that illustrates the distinctive non-paternalism of respect for persons in a more cooperative context. You are organizing a carpool with your neighbor to take turns dropping off your children at school. You are faced with the choice of driving on the days you prefer but with a smaller, less reliable vehicle or driving on the less desirable days but with a larger, more reliable vehicle. You tell your neighbor that you care more about the days on which you drive. If your neighbor respects you as a person, he will not dismiss this statement and privilege his own judgment about your pertinent interests. It would be insulting for him to respond, “You think so, huh? Actually, what’s more important for you is driving the larger vehicle.”

This highlights the familiar idea that respect for persons involves regarding others as having authority – reciprocal in scope and strength – to shape their interactions with one another, which they exercise, in part, by deciding how their various concerns and interests pertain to the structure of their interactions. But as before, we should not stop there. We do not regard persons merely as having reciprocal authority over their interactions; we also regard them as being reciprocally responsible for helping make decisions about the shape of their interactions. To see why, imagine that in the carpool case you refrained from expressing your relevant concerns (about driving days and vehicle size), and you also refrained from addressing any of your neighbor’s expressed interests. You in effect leave it to him to make all of the decisions about planning the carpool. Suppose he is not at all surprised or perturbed by this. In fact, at one point he says, with no hint of sarcasm, “Don’t worry about helping me to figure out what we’ll do. Weigh in if you like! But it is just as well that you leave it to me.”

This is as clearly a failure to respect you as a person as the above dismissal of your expressed interests. And it suggests that respect for persons involves taking persons to be responsible for helping make decisions about their interactions with one another. More specifically, it involves taking them to be responsible for expressing their own relevant concerns (judgments, interests, etc.) and accounting for the expressed concerns of others and, in this way, helping to work out mutually acceptable terms

of interaction with one another. (I mean this loosely; it should not be understood as a commitment to contractualist moral theory.)

The non-paternalism of respect for persons thus centrally concerns the responsibilities we take persons to have, in addition to their personal authority. It involves taking persons to be responsible for overseeing their lives⁷ and helping to work out mutually acceptable terms of interaction with one another. Notice that this helps clarify how respect for persons, as (in part) a non-paternalistic attitude, contrasts with our attitudes of care for young children. As children's caretakers, we feel responsible for overseeing their lives and how they relate to others. We do not attribute this responsibility to them. This point is worth stressing, because philosophers have tended to focus more heavily on the contrast between respect for persons and regarding others as mere things or tools.⁸

3. What kind of attitude is respect for persons, such that it involves taking others to be responsible for making decisions about their lives and interactions with one another? A full answer to this question will have both descriptive and normative components: it will provide a descriptive account of what kind of attitude respect for persons is, and it will also provide a normative account of why we are justified in holding this kind of attitude toward one another. In this and the following section, I aim to show how a "role-based view" of recognition respect for persons readily captures the descriptive components and normative justification of an attitude by which we take others to be responsible for their lives and interactions, as described above.

A role-based view says that respect for persons is a form of recognition respect for someone as holding a role in a social practice or institution. Social roles are defined by a set of responsibilities

⁷ You might point to cases in which individuals reasonably share their decision-making responsibility with those they trust. But these are not counterexamples to my claim here, because the responsibility was initially theirs to share.

⁸ This is clear, e.g., in Robert Nozick's famous use of Kant's "Formula of Humanity" in (Nozick 1974: 28-35). But for Kantian exceptions to this Kantian trend, see (Schapiro 1999; 2003), (Darwall 2002: 14-16), (Shiffrin 2000: 219).

(or duties) and corresponding authority (or rights) that the role-holder has within the practice or institution. The scope of a role's authority will derive from its responsibilities, in roughly the following way: the role-holder will wield the authority to do what is generally needed to carry out its responsibilities.⁹ For instance, someone who occupies the social role of a parent is responsible for caring for their young children, and so they have authority to make a wide range of decisions about their children's care and upbringing.

Respecting someone for their social role is thus a form of authority-regarding respect, insofar as it involves heeding their role-authority. But given how role-authority derives from role-responsibilities, such respect also will involve accepting their role-responsibilities.¹⁰ For accepting their role-responsibilities – the tasks with which they are charged in their role – is how we acknowledge the boundaries and scope of their role-authority. If respect for persons is a role-recognizing attitude, then, it will involve accepting that persons occupy a role by which they have certain forms of authority and that they bear responsibilities that fix the scope of that authority.

We can already see the promise of such a view for explaining how respect for persons involves accepting others' responsibilities to make decisions about their lives and interactions with one another (as described in section 2). For the scope of the authority we take those we respect as persons to have over their lives and interactions can be derived from these responsibilities. That is, we take them to have authority to make decisions about the basic structure of their lives, the exercise of which is generally needed to fulfill the responsibility of overseeing one's life, and we take them to have authority to help shape our interactions with them, the exercise of which is generally needed to fulfill the responsibility of helping to work out mutually acceptable terms of interaction with one another. This is just as we would expect if respect for persons is a role-recognizing attitude.

⁹ On this point, see (Goffman 1956: 11, 38), (Hershovitz 2011: 16-17), and (Wenar 2013).

¹⁰ Darwall's (2006) account of the recognition of second-person standing also takes respect for persons to be authority-heeding. But his account is not a role-based view; it is a version of the capacity-based view I discuss in Section 5.

But social roles do not exist in a vacuum. They figure into social practices (or institutions, but going forward I will focus only on practices¹¹). We cannot just posit a role that contains the responsibilities and corresponding forms of authority acknowledged by respect for persons and use this as our sole basis for constructing a role-based account of respect for persons. To fill out our account of a role-based attitude of recognition respect, we need to consider what kind of social practice contains this role and, assuming that we are familiar with some (likely imperfect) form of this attitude, whether there are reasons to think that the relevant practice is realized (in likely defective ways) in our actual social lives. And since we are trying to understand the nature of respect *for persons*, we also need to explain why this practice will, at least in its ideal form, include all persons.

We can understand social practices in terms of their defining purposes.¹² There may be multiple social practices that, in light of their defining purposes, fit the bill for a role-based view of respect for persons, i.e., that include all persons as participants in a role characterized by the above two responsibilities and associated forms of authority, and that also mirror some familiar aspects of our social lives. Here I will focus on just one – a social practice defined by the purpose of solving the Rousseauian problem of “inflamed amour-propre.”

This is the problem of interacting under conditions that transform our desire to be well-regarded by others into a desire to dominate them. It is common ground for many of Rousseau’s recent commentators that inflamed amour-propre is a malignant form of a healthy concern – “benign” amour-propre – that all socialized human beings have to be well-regarded.¹³ (Dent 1988; Dent 2005;

¹¹ This is in part because of the morally required pervasiveness of respect for persons in our social lives.

¹² Cf. how Manuel Vargas (2013) and Miranda Fricker (2014) theorize about blame in terms of the purpose of practices.

¹³ To be clear, then, solving the problem of inflamed amour-propre does not require persons to entirely disavow their concern with how others regard them. Benign amour-propre, which we might conceive as a kind of self-respect, still cares about the regard of others. For a nuanced discussion of the different ways that self-respect might depend on receiving high regard from others, see (Bird 2010).

Neuhouser 2008; Neuhouser 2014; Cohen 2010; Kolodny 2010) Benign amour-propre becomes inflamed when, in seeking to be well-regarded by others, we interact under social conditions that make our standing to receive basic consideration from others fragile and, thus, tend to make us anxious about being well-regarded by others.

To explain, imagine that everyone with whom you interacted would ignore your proposals and dismiss your concerns unless you won their esteem or admiration by, say, proving your wit, showing off your athletic prowess, or charming them with some well-timed compliment. Only then would they take you seriously and pay attention to what you have to say. You would naturally respond to these conditions by trying to continually impress and flatter others, in order to more reliably receive basic consideration from them. But even if you succeeded, the resulting consideration you received from others would remain fragile. Your success could be lost at any moment, not only to the fickleness of human favor, but also to suddenly finding yourself stacked up against those who are more impressive or charming. This would lead you to desire more control over how others think and feel about you. You would desire to be in a position to make others take you seriously, to dominate them.¹⁴

This is a manifestation of how social anxiety motivates general (as opposed to targeted) risk-minimizing behavior.¹⁵ (Kurth 2016: 2-3) The risk that the social anxiety behind inflamed amour-propre seeks to minimize concerns whether one will (continue to) receive basic consideration from others, and taking general steps to minimize this risk entails seeking to eliminate others' latitude not to give one basic consideration. This amounts to a desire to control whether they give one basic consideration, which amounts to a desire to dominate them.

We can clarify and condense the above problem of inflamed amour-propre into the following three plausible ideas: (i) Apart from being esteemed, loved, and admired by others in various ways, we

¹⁴ This is a generalized version of the tales Rousseau tells in the *Discourse on Inequality (DI)* and *Emile* about the generation of inflamed amour-propre. For *DI*, see (Rousseau 1997a: 164-167, 170-172) and for *Emile*, see (Rousseau 1979: 65-67).

¹⁵ See also (Öhman 2008: 716-17) and (Epstein 1972; 308-11), discussed further below.

care about whether they give us basic consideration, that is, whether they give our decisions, proposals, and stated concerns some default weight in deciding how to interact with us,¹⁶ (ii) winning the esteem, affection, and/or admiration of others is the most natural way to receive such basic consideration, and (iii) when we realize that they will give us basic consideration only if we somehow garner their esteem, affection, or admiration, we will become anxious, which in turn will make us desire control over whether they give us basic consideration – inflamed amour-propre.

Beyond distilling some intuitively plausible ideas from Rousseau’s writings, these three claims have some empirical plausibility. Claim (iii) reflects a common view about how anxiety, including social anxiety, is distinct from fear – specifically, how anxiety generates a non-targeted, risk-minimizing and assurance-seeking response, whereas fear generates a targeted risk-mitigating response. (Kurth 2016; Öhman 2008: 716-17; Epstein 1972: 308-11) Claims (i) and (ii) align with studies revealing the high value we attach to the status of being well-regarded by others and the competitive approach we take toward attaining and defending this status, including studies showing how wage-satisfaction is heavily influenced by social comparisons and one’s place within an organization’s wage hierarchy.¹⁷

An empirical assumption of claims (i)-(iii) is that all (or almost all) human beings are susceptible to inflamed amour-propre, and not just, say, humans in the Western world subject to the economic and social conditions of capitalism. One route to begin substantiating this universality assumption may be through attachment theory, an empirically- (and cross-culturally) informed psychological theory originally about the role that secure attachment to caregivers plays in child development, but which has been extended to adult relationships, including loving relationships between romantic partners.¹⁸

¹⁶ This distinction between different kinds of interpersonal regard partly corresponds to the Darwallian distinction between recognition and appraisal respect. On this point, see (Neuhouser 2008: 63-67) and (Dent 2005: 52-55).

¹⁷ See, e.g., (Clark and Oswald 1996) and (Frank 1984). I should note that these studies tend not to make fine-grained distinctions between the different forms of regard by which we are valued by others, which would be necessary to establish (i) and (ii) in contrast with more generic claims about our tendency to compete for being well-regarded by others.

¹⁸ For a helpful discussion of attachment theory and its connection to adult love, see (Wonderly 2017: sec. 4).

The universal need for secure attachment, and the role that secure attachment plays in alleviating anxiety, provides some support for the idea that the desire to be well-regarded by others, and the anxiety-ridden tendencies that can arise from this desire, is a universal trait, given how secure attachment centrally involves reliably receiving basic consideration from others.

Let us move on to discuss how to solve the problem of inflamed amour-propre. This centrally involves removing the social conditions that make us anxious about receiving basic consideration from others and so tend to inflame our desire to be well-regarded by them. My main claim will be that removing these social conditions requires instantiating a social practice whose participants occupy a role defined by the responsibilities and associated authority discussed in section 2, and that includes all persons as participants.

But before explaining why we need this specific kind of social practice, it is worth pausing to consider why we need a social practice at all, in addition to the political institutions and individual virtues that also help solve the problem of inflamed amour-propre. Notice that when we participate in social practices, our interactions are structured by the roles we occupy in those practices. We interact as colleagues, neighbors, and adults. This occurs through the reliable proliferation of norms that lay out the responsibilities and authority that define our social roles (as discussed above). These widely accepted norms set default constraints on our deliberations about how to treat others and set default expectations for how others will treat us.¹⁹ That is, the proliferation of the norms, which requires public knowledge that people generally follow them and occupy the roles they define, makes the following of the norms and enactment of the roles a standard, expected feature of social life. Practices are unique in doing this in our social lives.²⁰ Political institutions do not do it – at least not all of it –

¹⁹ These are some relatively uncontroversial claims about social norms that several recent accounts of norm-acceptance would endorse, including (Bicchieri 2006) and (Sripada and Stich 2007). See also (Darwall 2006: Ch. 7), (Walker 2006: ch. 4), and (Railton 2006).

²⁰ Cheshire Calhoun (2016: 13, 71) provides a different but compatible account of how social practices play an indispensable role in our moral lives, which focuses on the social embeddedness of our moral self-conception.

because enforceable laws and policies are too limited in their reach. Individual virtues do not do it, either, because even the widespread coincidence of individual virtue that supports the behavioral patterns encoded by a given set of norms would remain just that – a coincidence. It would not entail public knowledge that people generally follow the norms in question, as each individual’s cultivation of the relevant virtues would be discrete and would not require the creation of default expectations about people following the norms.²¹ In this way, it would leave open the question of whether the norms constrain any given social encounter.

Why does this distinctive place of practices in our social lives matter for solving the problem of inflamed amour-propre? What inflames our concern to be well-regarded by others, again, is the anxiety of realizing that others will not give us basic consideration unless we earn their esteem or admiration. This is a fragile basis for receiving basic consideration. Thus, to remove inflammatory social conditions, we need a secure, publicly known basis for receiving basic consideration from others, one which will be sufficient for alleviating our anxiety about receiving basic consideration. We need to be able to count on others giving default weight to our decisions and proposals, independently of our estimable traits and achievements. This means that we need a social practice that makes receiving basic consideration a standard, publicly expected default of our interactions.

This is why we need a social practice to help solve the problem of inflamed amour-propre. But why think that this anti-inflammatory practice must incorporate all persons into a role whose defining responsibilities and associated forms of authority include those discussed in Section 2? To see why, let me sketch some of what follows from structuring a practice that serves the anti-inflammatory purpose. Consider first that each participant in an anti-inflammatory practice will need to be responsible for helping to work out mutually acceptable terms of interaction with one another, because such a practice will need to guard against widespread reliance on those who, due to wisdom or charm,

²¹ For further elaboration of this point, see (Thompson 2008: 194-6).

tend to attract deference. Unless all participants in the practice are regarded as responsible for working out mutually acceptable terms of interaction with one another, the structure of their interactions will tend to be determined by those whose personal attributes naturally increase the weight that others attach to their judgments. Unless we regard everyone as sharing in the responsibility to work out mutually acceptable terms of interaction, those who do not possess the requisite traits (wisdom, charm, etc.) will find themselves at the mercy of those who do. These traits would become the currency of receiving basic consideration, and everyone would tend to become anxious about proving that they have these traits (or at least proving that others do not have them). Such is the anxiety that generates inflamed amour-propre.

If that is right, then, second, the anti-inflammatory practice will need to grant its participants the authority to make decisions about how their interests and concerns matter for their interactions with one another. This follows from how the authority attached to a role in a social practice is determined by what is generally needed to carry out the role's responsibilities, as I discussed earlier. Carrying out the responsibility of helping to work out mutually acceptable terms of interaction with others involves reaching conclusions about one's relevant concerns and conveying these conclusions to one's interactors. Thus, a role that involves this responsibility must also include the authority to determine how one's concerns come to bear on the structure of one's interactions with others.

This implies, third, that participants in the anti-inflammatory social practice will need to be responsible for overseeing their lives. This is because, in expressing how their interests and concerns matter for their interactions, participants are appealing in part to the decisions that settle the basic structure of their lives. These decisions are what ground many of their pertinent interests and concerns. Individuals will be taken seriously in expressing how their interests and concerns matter for their interactions in this practice (at least in its ideal characterization, if not in the defective, unjust

instantiations of it that play out in our actual lives) only to the extent they are viewed as responsible for making the decisions that ground these interests and concerns.

Why is that? Let us assume first that many of a person's interests and concerns derive from the decisions they make about the structure of their life. (Ebels-Duggan 2008: 149-52) Assume second that all persons undergo a process of maturation, the early stages of which involve guardians being responsible for making decisions about the structure of their life. This means that the practice can be configured in one of three ways: (i) upon maturity, no one is treated as responsible for making decisions about the structure of a given person's life, (ii) for any person *P*, only *P* is treated as responsible (by default) for making decisions about the structure of *P*'s life, or (iii) for any person *P*, persons other than (or in addition to) *P* are treated as (co-) responsible (by default) for making decisions about the structure of *P*'s life. It is not clear how the anti-inflammatory practice could coherently implement options (i) or (iii). In option (i), persons do not inherit the standing to be regarded as responsible for making decisions about their lives from their guardians. It seems that, in order to become regarded as mature persons in our own right, we must inherit whatever standing our guardians previously had with respect to the decisions made about the structure of our lives. Option (iii) replaces our previous guardians with a different set of guardians, of which we may be one member, but that still fails to put us in a position to be taken seriously as the primary authors of the decisions that underlie our interests and concerns. For, against the social backdrop in which we were previously under the tutelage of guardians, we still fail to gain the kind of exclusive responsibility for making decisions about our lives that our guardians held. This leaves option (ii), in which persons are regarded, by default, as exclusively responsible for making decisions about the structure of their lives.

Fourth, and finally, if a practice makes its participants responsible for making decisions about their lives in the above way, then it will also need to give them authority for overseeing their lives. To apply again our earlier idea about how role-responsibilities relate to role-authority, someone could not

be expected to make a wide range of decisions about the structure of her life without being granted the authority to oversee her life (including some authority to determine how others are involved with her life). What the foregoing line of thought provides, then, is a sketch of why participants in the anti-inflammatory practice will occupy a role defined by the basic responsibilities for, and associated forms of authority over, their lives and interactions with one another, as described in section 2. (Note that I am not saying that these are the only responsibilities and forms of authority attached to this role and/or that are recognized by respect for persons.)

I should now address the worry that my view is badly circular. It only appears to provide a role-based description of the attitude of respect for persons by sneaking a conception of this attitude into its characterization of amour-propre, which is a desire (in part) to receive basic consideration from others. What is this basic consideration, you might wonder, but being respected as a person? The foregoing argument makes the answer clear. While it is true that being respected as a person is sufficient for receiving basic consideration from others, it is not necessary. In its most basic form, the basic consideration that amour-propre seeks is just having one's judgments and decisions be given default weight by others. This does not entail the distinctive marks of respect for persons. Such basic consideration could also come in the form, e.g., of being respected as someone's social superior. That is, one way to receive basic consideration is to be respected as socially superior, as having expansive decision-making and moral authority on account of one's elite status. This is clearly different from being respected as a person. On my view, the distinctive features of respect for persons are explained, not by the basic consideration amour-propre seeks, but by what is necessary to institute a social practice that alleviates the conditions that inflame amour-propre.

Consider next the issue of whether and why this practice will incorporate all persons as participants. Given its defining purpose, anyone who shares and can help solve the problem of inflamed amour-propre should be incorporated as a participant. That is, given that the practice's purpose is to

remove the social conditions that give rise to inflamed amour-propre, then anyone who is susceptible to inflamed amour-propre, and who can help mitigate it by accepting the norms of the anti-inflammatory practice, should occupy the role of a full-fledged participant in that practice. Otherwise there will remain individuals with whom we might interact under the social conditions that inflame amour-propre. The class of individuals who share and can help solve the problem of inflamed amour-propre is roughly co-extensive with the class of individuals who, intuitively, count as persons.

Finally, notice how the ideal of the anti-inflammatory practice, specified in terms of its defining purpose of solving the problem of inflamed amour-propre, overlaps with our familiar practices of becoming and interacting as adults. This is important because, as I indicated above, if the attitude of respect for persons is a familiar feature of our lives, even if only in some distorted form, then any role-based view will need to explain how the ideal social practice that encodes the role recognized by respect for persons is realized to some extent in our actual social practices. We can do this for my view by considering the legal, and associated social, practices of emancipating minors before the age of majority. In most places in the United States, for instance, teenagers can petition to be released from the oversight of their legal guardians, who up to that point have been responsible for caring for them. If successful, the teenager is then granted most of the rights of a legal adult, including the right to make basic financial and medical decisions, and their prior guardians are released from the obligation to care for them. This legal procedure has important social correlates: emancipated minors typically choose to no longer live with their guardians, they may get married and form their own families, and they may cease to continue in their family's religious and cultural practices.

All of these practices concern, at least in part, the question of whether the teenager or, instead, her guardians have the authority to oversee her life (e.g., making medical decisions) and shape her interactions with others (e.g., marriage), and correspondingly, whether she or her guardians are responsible for how her life goes, i.e., making decisions about her life and interactions with others. This

suggests that the responsibilities and authority that define the role all persons occupy in the anti-inflammatory practice overlap significantly with those attached to the role of an adult in our legal and social practices. That is, a part of what we are doing in recognizing someone as an adult is regarding them as having the authority and responsibilities that characterize role-holders in the anti-inflammatory practice. And this coheres, further, with the more general idea that respect for persons is a non-paternalistic attitude that contrasts with our caretaking attitudes toward children. Insofar as children are, to varying degrees, appropriate targets of paternalizing attitudes, we should expect that the attitude of respect for persons is realized in social practices that concern our status of adults. (Now, this is not to say that our social and legal practices of adulthood fully realize the anti-inflammatory practice and/or respect for persons; far from it. Among other problems, these practices have often marginalized – by way of infantilization – groups of individuals who should be regarded as persons.)

4. In addition to the above descriptive account of the social role and associated practice that is the focus of a role-based attitude of respect for persons, my view also provides a normative account of how this attitude is justified. As on any role-based view, this justification proceeds at two levels (somewhat like two-tier normative ethical theories, such as rule-consequentialism). At the first level, and for any given individual, we consider whether that individual is a legitimate occupant of the role recognized by the attitude of respect for persons. If so, then relative to the practice in question – on my view, the anti-inflammatory practice – other practice-participants are justified in respecting that individual as a person. That is, all other participants have sufficient practice-based reasons to respect the role-holder as a person, provided that the practice as a whole is justified.²²

This points to the second level of justification, at which we ask whether and how the practice is justified. While there are different ways to justify practices, it is standard to appeal to the morally

²² For a classic statement of this view of practice-based reasons (which I discuss below), see (Rawls 1955).

important purposes they fulfill. On my Rousseauian view, we appeal to the anti-inflammatory purpose, showing how the relevant practice helps remove the social conditions that inflame amour-propre. I did this above by showing how the anti-inflammatory social practice, along with the attitude of respect required of participants in it, removes the conditions that make us anxious about receiving basic consideration from others. And so we have a two-tiered justification of respect for persons: individuals' attitudes of role-recognizing respect are justified by practice-based reasons, whose normative force depends on the second-level justification of the anti-inflammatory practice as a whole.²³

You might doubt whether the moral justification of respect for persons can derive from the purpose of a social practice in this two-tiered way. Relatedly, you might also worry that, given how my role-based view ties respect for persons to participation in a social practice, it cannot explain how respect for persons is an attitude that all persons non-contingently deserve.²⁴ To show how this cluster of worries is misguided, I will focus on drawing out the implications of my Rousseauian role-based view, although other role-based views may be able to alleviate these worries, as well.

One of the underlying concerns here is that, on my view, it seems we can disregard those who are marginalized by defective instantiations of the anti-inflammatory practice. For my view says that we are justified in respecting others as persons only insofar as they are role-holders in some instantiation of the anti-inflammatory practice. But even if someone is marginalized by a defective instantiation of the anti-inflammatory practice, my view implies that we should be concerned for them as those who should, but do not, have full standing in it.²⁵ This is so in the same general way that, when some

²³ You might worry, then, that my view faces the same worries that have long dogged rule-consequentialism, which arise from the question of why an individual should adhere to the prescribed rules (or norms) when breaking them would better serve the justifying aim of the overarching system of rules. But I think that rule-consequentialists have devised compelling ways of solving these problems that I can utilize; see, e.g., (Hooker 2007: 516-18).

²⁴ This is similar to the worry that Jules Holroyd (2009: 329-30) raises about "relational" conceptions of autonomy.

²⁵ This is in part because respecting someone as a role-occupant requires a background commitment to the justifying purposes of the practice that contains the role; for, again, the reasons for such respect will derive from what justifies the practice as a whole, and this includes the practice's justifying purposes. (Miller 2010: Ch. 2) Now, as Vargas (2013: 193-94) points out, participating in a practice does not typically involve explicitly pursuing the practice's purposes. One need

are unjustly denied the standing of a full-fledged citizen in our political society – say, they are denied suffrage on account of their religion or race – we cannot sensibly regard them as fellow citizens with the full range of rights that citizenship entails. Doing so would add insult to injury. Instead, we regard them as those who should, but do not, have those rights. Something similar is true of those who are wrongly denied full standing in the anti-inflammatory practice. They share and can help solve the problem of inflamed amour-propre, and thus we regard them as those who should, but do not, share our standing as participants in that practice.²⁶

There is a different way of pressing the worry that my view mistakenly precludes some individuals from having the standing to be respected as persons. You might notice that we could solve the problem of inflamed amour-propre simply by modifying our psychological makeup to erase our susceptibility to inflamed amour-propre. It seems that, on my view, individuals who were modified in this way would no longer be rightful participants in the anti-inflammatory practice and thus no longer have the standing to be respected as persons.

My view does have this implication. But this is not a problem. Any account of respect for persons will say that, if someone ceases to have some of the features necessary for having the standing to be respected as a person, then they will no longer have the standing to be respected as a person. But perhaps this objection is getting at something else, which is that our susceptibility to inflamed amour-propre is an irrelevant feature of our minds, which we could lose without losing any of the

not – and if Rawls (1955: 28) is right, cannot – overtly subsume all of one’s activities in the practice as means to the end of achieving its purposes. But it remains that one must have a background commitment to those purposes.

²⁶ A further worry here concerns individuals who share (at least some aspects of) the problem of inflamed amour-propre but who cannot fully participate in the anti-inflammatory practice, such as older children or adults whose cognitive makeup precludes such practice-participation. In responding to this worry, the details about the moral development of children at different ages, and the different kinds of cognitive variations in adults that might prevent practice-participation, matter a great deal, and so I can only offer a high-level reply here, which is that my view will reflect the intuitive moral complexities of relating to these various individuals. Insofar as they share the problem of inflamed amour-propre, there is pressure to incorporate them into the life of the practice dedicated to solving this problem. But insofar as they cannot fully participate in this practice, there is pressure to modify our relations to them accordingly.

features that are intuitively important for deserving respect as a person.²⁷ I disagree. If we imagine creatures who are like us except that they are not at all susceptible to inflamed amour-propre, we are not imagining our fellow persons. We are imagining angelic beings, worthy of some attitude other than respect for persons. Here it is important to distinguish between individuals who reliably check their tendencies toward inflamed amour-propre (call them “saints”) from those who, we are imagining, have no such tendencies at all (“angels”). Similar to what Kant says about the difference between rational beings who are and are not subject to moral duties in the *Groundwork*, we can think of saints as our moral peers who, despite their success in overcoming inflamed amour-propre, still are confronted with this problem; the same is not true of angels, who do not confront it at all.²⁸

Let us turn now to a different, but related, worry, which is that my view’s two-level, practice-based justification of respect for persons fails to capture the distinctively moral justification of respect for persons. One way of stating this concern is to point out that respect for persons is normatively required. It is not merely one among many desirable ways of regarding others. Yet this is what my view seems to suggest when it justifies respect for persons in terms of the anti-inflammatory purpose, which is just one among many worthwhile goals that our social practices may serve.

Let me start by clarifying my view’s appeal to the aim of solving the problem of inflamed amour-propre. I take the problem of inflamed amour-propre to be morally serious – as pertaining to important moral values and principles. There are two strands of thought in Rousseau’s writings that bear this out. In his earlier, more political writings, solving the problem of inflamed amour-propre is important because it constitutes our social recovery of freedom. (Neuhouser 2014: 135-6) He famously claims in *The Social Contract*, for instance, that the purpose of forming a political society is to make us

²⁷ And what about individuals who do not care about avoiding inflamed amour-propre? My view does not exclude them, because whether they share the problem of inflamed amour-propre does not depend on whether they care about it.

²⁸ See (Kant 2002: 30-1). Consider also Kant’s discussion in the *Religion* (Kant 1996b: 103-5) of the Christ-figure as a moral exemplar, who, conceived as a fellow person, must be viewed as susceptible to self-interested inclinations, even though he is absolutely successful in prioritizing the moral law over the sometimes-immoral influence of his inclinations.

“as free as before.” This idea, that there is a basic moral imperative to restore some form of pre-social freedom-as-independence, is shared by many moral and political theories, and so if the problem of inflamed amour-propre prevents us from satisfying this imperative, it is plausibly a morally serious problem.²⁹ A second strand from Rousseau’s later writings claims that the problem of inflamed amour-propre is, at bottom, a problem of alienation – our lack of a coherent sense of self (or “sentiment of existence”) within society. (Gauthier 2006: ch. 4 and 7) The basic idea here is that, when we are susceptible to inflamed amour-propre, our dependence on the high regard of others prevents us from experiencing ourselves as capable of meeting our basic desires and needs. Insofar as this is incompatible with a virtuous life, especially one characterized by autonomy and honesty about one’s standing relative to others, then it follows, again, the problem of inflamed amour-propre is morally serious. And on either account of the moral seriousness of the problem of inflamed amour-propre, it is clear that Rousseau thinks this problem is morally fundamental, insofar as a wide range of other morally serious problems stem from it, such as unjust inequality and many forms of viciousness.³⁰

With these clarifications in mind, I can begin addressing the worry that, on my view, respect for persons is not normatively required. If Rousseau is right that the problem is morally serious, and that a host of other serious moral and political problems, such as unjust forms of inequality, are largely due to problem of inflamed amour-propre, then the problem of inflamed amour-propre is morally fundamental. We are therefore not permitted to leave it unsolved. And if it stems from basic features of human psychology (as I suggested in section 3), then we are bound to face this problem. We cannot hope to avoid it simply by encountering different persons, given that all persons harbor the tendencies

²⁹ This moral imperative figures prominently, e.g., in Kant’s political theory. See especially (Kant 1996a at 6:256) and, for a helpful account of the constraints Kant’s view here places on our political institutions, (Pallikkathayil 2010).

³⁰ He famously tries to show in the *Discourse on Inequality* (Rousseau 1997b: 170) that socio-economic inequality, and various associated forms of injustice, arise from widespread inflamed amour-propre. And in *Emile* (among other places), he claims that many morally disordered personal relationships have the symptoms of, or are caused by, inflamed amour-propre. (Rousseau 1979: 250-3)

toward social comparison and anxiety that give way to inflamed amour-propre. This means that either we have established the practice that helps solve this problem by requiring us, its participants, to respect one another as persons, or we have not yet fully established that practice but must do so. My view thus entails that respect for persons is normatively required.

But you might point out that, even if respect for persons is normatively required, it does not follow that we have distinctively moral reasons to respect one another as persons. Responding to a social problem that we are required to solve is one thing; responding to distinctively moral reasons is another. To answer this challenge, I assume it will be sufficient to show how our reasons to respect one another as persons are overriding reasons that are tied to the Strawsonian reactive attitudes. This is not to say that all moral reasons are overriding and/or connected to the reactive attitudes. But at least in the context of interpersonal relations, if a reason is overriding (in the manner discussed below) and connected to the reactive attitudes (which characterize our moral reactions to one another's behavior), then it will be a moral reason.

Begin with my earlier claim that, on a role-based view, our reasons to respect one another as persons are practice-based reasons. They are reasons we have in virtue of participating in a justified social practice. As Rawls (1955: 24-27) points out, practice-based reasons function in a distinctive way: they drown out considerations external to the practice and function as independently sufficient grounds for decision and action, provided that the practice is justified. Joseph Raz's (1986: Ch. 3) account of the preemptive reasons stemming from practical authority provides us with a helpful way of developing Rawls' idea. If practice-based reasons are preemptive reasons, then they do three things: (i) they require something of participants, (ii) they supersede the reasons that justify participation in the practice in general, and (iii) they exclude conflicting considerations.³¹ If this is what our practice-based reasons to respect one another as persons are like, then these are overriding reasons in at least

³¹ Following Darwall's (2013: 152-155) account of how to understand Raz's considered view in (Raz 2006: 1021-1022).

the following important way: they will displace and undercut a wide range of other considerations that would otherwise come to bear on the question of whether or not to respect others as persons.

Let us next follow Darwall (2006) in thinking that the moral reasons that apply to interpersonal relations stem from normative requirements that are enforced by the Strawsonian reactive attitudes – blame, resentment, indignation, and the like. What do requirements that are enforced by these attitudes have in common? There is no quick answer to that question, but we can settle for Strawson’s (2008) original, broad idea: all of these requirements concern our expectation of “good will” from one another. The sort of respect we garner as participants in the anti-inflammatory social practice is plausibly a central component of this good will. This would imply that failures to respect others as participants in the anti-inflammatory social practice should be met with the negative reactive attitudes (blame, resentment) and, accordingly, that the practice-based reasons we have to respect others in this way are moral in character. This is borne out in our social lives: insofar as the anti-inflammatory practice overlaps with our practices of becoming and interacting as adults, we do respond to failures of anti-inflammatory respect, e.g., being treated as children, with the negative reactive attitudes.

In sum, my role-based view’s two-tiered justification of respect for persons has promising resources for explaining the non-contingency, universality, and distinctive moral significance of respect for persons. We all share the problem of inflamed amour-propre. When some persons are excluded from a defective instantiation of the anti-inflammatory practice, we must be concerned for them as those who should be our fellow participants in that practice. And our practice-based reasons to respect one another as persons are overriding reasons tied to the reactive attitudes and thereby plausibly function as moral reasons.³² My role-based view thus provides a plausible normative account

³² Bennett Helm (2017) develops a similar account: he thinks that being respected as a person consists in being respected as a member of a “community of respect” constituted by its members’ joint commitment to its norms. But there are two important differences between my account and his. First, Helm does not extend his account to explain how there could be a universal “community of respect” (or in my terms, practice) that in principle includes all persons. Second, Helm relies

of respect for persons to complement the descriptive account put forward in section 3, insofar as this attitude is understood as a non-paternalistic attitude that acknowledges our responsibilities and associated authority for our lives and interactions with others.

Now, this does not cover all of the important aspects of respect for persons, including some aspects that are not naturally conceived as non-paternalistic. For instance, you might think that respect for persons involves being concerned to promote others' ends. But notice that, following Kant (1996a, 6:448ff), we can view our duties to promote others' ends as duties of love, not respect. And I am happy to concede that there are morally requisite attitudes other than respect for persons, such as love.³³ A further, commonly discussed feature of respect for persons is that it precludes regarding others merely as objects, whom we can dispose of as we see fit in light of our purposes. This is readily explained on my view by the fact that, in recognizing someone for their role in the anti-inflammatory practice, we take seriously their decisions and judgments independently of how doing so serves our own purposes. In this way, our regard for them is not limited to how they serve our purposes. Relatedly (and anticipating one version of the "capacity-based" view I examine in section 5), you might also point out that respect for persons involves regarding persons as having intrinsic value. While I agree, I think the relevant notion of value is best understood using the "buck-passing" account of value, on which someone's having intrinsic value is a matter of their having properties that provide reasons to hold certain valuing attitudes toward them. (Scanlon 1998: 97ff) For persons, at least one of the relevant valuing attitudes is respect for persons, for which we then need an account, such as the account I have developed here.³⁴

heavily on the notions of accountability and answerability to explain the responsibilities recognized by respect for persons and so does not, as I clarify below, account for the non-directed responsibilities discussed in Section 2.

³³ See, though, for a Kantian account of love that attempts to build in some of the non-paternalistic requirements of respect, (Ebels-Duggan 2008).

³⁴ There are several additional marks of respect for persons that I cannot explore here. One that is worth briefly mentioning is being disposed to treat persons in ways that engage their rational capacities, rather than manipulating them. There are two things I want to point out about this: first, it is a matter of serious debate whether respect for persons sometimes supports regarding persons as non-rational – see (Schroeder 2019) – and so I am not sure to what extent my account needs

A further, important dimension of respect for persons that my role-based view also may seem to overlook is self-respect – the self-directed form of the attitude of respect for persons.³⁵ But I do not think that my view faces any unusual difficulties accounting for self-respect. Just as we can recognize others as holding a role with certain responsibilities and authority, so we can recognize ourselves as such role-holders by, roughly, taking seriously the fact that we bear the role’s responsibilities and have corresponding authority for our lives and interactions with others. This “taking seriously” designates a readiness to enact, assert, and defend our role-based standing, especially if it is in danger of being overlooked or undermined. This is in the same way we might say, e.g., that no “self-respecting” teacher would allow their classroom to descend into chaos, or that no self-respecting lawyer would allow their clients to walk ill-prepared into cross-examination by the prosecution.

5. To conclude, I want to compare my role-based view to the prevailing, “capacity-based” view of respect for persons. My aim in doing so is not to establish the superiority of my view or the failure of the capacity-based view. Rather, by comparing how they each attempt to explain the important descriptive and normative features of respect for persons discussed above, I want to show how my role-based view compares favorably enough to the capacity-based view to be taken seriously as a competing account of respect for persons.

“Capacity-based” is meant to characterize the wide, but mostly Kantian, family of views that take respect for persons to be an attitude that recognizes individuals for their special agential capacities, including their capacities for autonomy and/or rationality. These views are motivated in part by the thought that persons, in being endowed with these special forms of agency, can rise above the push

to account for the above disposition. Second, insofar as my account requires that we regard others as having the standing to structure their own affairs, this places constraints on our willingness to meddle in their affairs without their permission that will preclude many forms of manipulation.

³⁵ Consider, e.g., how self-respect figures into Hill’s (1973: 97-9) influential account of the vice of servility, on which servility is a paradigmatic failure of self-respect. And for related discussion of humility and self-respect, see (Dillon 2015).

and pull of natural instinct and desire. This seems to make persons morally significant and deserving of respect in ways that other creatures are not. As Sarah Buss (2005: 196) characterizes this thought, “we alone are not mere pawns of nature, at the mercy of our instincts[.]”

Like the role-based view, we can understand the capacity-based view as having both descriptive and normative components. Descriptively, the capacity-based view casts respect for persons as a form of recognition respect for persons on account of their agential capacities. Normatively, the capacity-based view says that respect for persons is justified by these capacities’ moral significance.

Beyond these broad claims, different versions of the capacity-based view diverge about which kinds of agential capacities are the focus of respect for persons (and how to specify them), what kind of agential recognition is central to respect for persons, and what kind of moral significance our agential capacities have. Without sorting through all of these issues, it is worth highlighting two importantly different (but perhaps ultimately compatible) approaches to explaining how respect for persons recognizes persons for their agential capacities: a value-appreciating approach, on which respect for persons responds to the intrinsic value putatively grounded in our agential capacities, and an authority-heeding approach, on which respect for persons responds to the practical authority putatively grounded in our agential capacities.³⁶ (Waldron 2015: 23-7)

It seems to me that, on either approach, the capacity-based view does not readily explain how respect for persons acknowledges both the responsibilities and associated forms of authority that persons have for their lives and interactions with one another. On the value-appreciating approach, the most natural line of explanation is this: (i) if someone’s intrinsic value resides in some of her capacities,

³⁶ For examples of the former, value-appreciating approach, see especially J. David Velleman (2008), Joseph Raz (2001) and Carl Cranor (1975), and also, for theorists who adopt it but only in passing or tacitly, see Robin Dillon (1992), Sarah Conly (2013), Onora O’Neill (1989: 138-40), and Hill (1992; 1997; 2012). For examples of the latter, authority-heeding approach, see Stephen Darwall (2006) and Christine Korsgaard (forthcoming). There are other capacity-based theorists who are somewhat ambivalent between these two approaches, including John Rawls (1999: §77), Robert Noggle (1999), David Sussman (2003), and Ian Carter (2011).

then she is responsible for exercising those capacities, and (ii) exercising her relevant capacities is sufficient for discharging her responsibilities, and exercising her authority, to make decisions about her life and interactions with others. My first worry is that it does not obviously follow from appreciating the intrinsic value grounded in someone's agential capacities that one also accepts that she is responsible for exercising those capacities. I also doubt claim (ii), because it seems that we can exercise our value-grounding agential capacities without yet fully discharging our responsibilities to make decisions about our lives and interactions with others.³⁷

The authority-heeding approach to the capacity-based view will propose instead that, in respecting the practical authority grounded in someone's agential capacities, we will thereby acknowledge their corresponding responsibilities – namely, their responsibilities to heed the demands we take ourselves to have the reciprocal authority to make of them.³⁸ It thus will try to account for the same aspects of respect for persons as my role-based view, just in reverse – my view starts with the responsibilities we acknowledge (in respecting others as persons) and infers from this the forms of authority we heed, whereas the authority-heeding capacity-based view starts with the forms of authority we heed and infers from this the responsibilities we acknowledge. Notice, however, that the only responsibilities that the authority-heeding approach implies we attribute to those we respect as persons are those that correspond to our authority to make demands of them – the directed responsibilities that persons have to one another. And at least some of the responsibilities discussed in Section 2 are non-directed. Take the responsibility of overseeing one's life. We are not ultimately responsible to anyone else for overseeing our lives. This is shown by the fact that oftentimes no one has the standing

³⁷ For instance, we might choose always to defer to the suggestions of a temperamental friend, both about our personal lives and our interactions with him. In so choosing, we will exercise whatever agential capacities (e.g., reasons-responsiveness) that ground our intrinsic value, and yet we would not succeed in overseeing our life or helping work out mutually acceptable terms of interaction with others.

³⁸ Stephen Darwall (2006) has done the most to develop an authority-heeding approach to the capacity-based view.

to blame or resent us when we fail to discharge this responsibility. (Watson 1996: 231) It seems to be a non-directed responsibility, which is not explained by the authority-heeding approach.

This of course does not yet show that the value-appreciating and authority-heeding versions of the capacity-based view cannot be further developed to address these shortcomings and better capture how respect for persons involves accepting persons' responsibilities to make decisions about their lives and interactions (including some non-directed responsibilities).³⁹ It is just to suggest that my role-based view more readily captures this feature of respect for persons.

Now, when it comes to some of the other features of respect for persons I have discussed, such as its non-contingent, universal, and distinctively moral significance, or the connection between respecting others and self-respect, the capacity-based view seems to be on much better footing. Insofar as all persons have the relevant agential capacities (to a sufficient degree⁴⁰), then they should take themselves to have the special value or authority grounded in those capacities – self-respect. And for the same reason, no one can fail to be the proper object of respect for persons (it is universal and non-contingent), and our reasons for respecting others as persons will stem from their agency-grounded value or authority and thus plausibly function as moral reasons. The capacity-based view provides an elegant way of capturing these important features of respect for persons.

But I have argued that my role-based view does not fall short by comparison here, even though, admittedly, its account is less straightforward. (It relies, again, on a two-tiered justification of respect for persons.) It is also worth noting that, on my view, having certain agential capacities is still

³⁹ E.g., in (Korsgaard 2008; Korsgaard forthcoming), Korsgaard thinks that respect for persons consists in accepting the authority grounded in persons' capacity for self-constitution. Importantly, she (Korsgaard forthcoming) also thinks that having the standing of a person involves various non-directed responsibilities to (in my terms) oversee one's life, which she elsewhere describes as the "job" of self-constitution (2008: 26, 174-5). While I cannot explore these issues here, my basic worry about Korsgaard's view is that we do not have reason to regard persons in terms of their capacity for self-constitution (as she understands it), rather than some thinner agential capacity, unless we already respect them as persons.

⁴⁰ There is a deep, thorny issue here about how respect for persons can be something equally due all persons, given that the traits in virtue of which we are the proper objects of respect vary by degree across persons. In political philosophy, this has been called the "basis of equality" problem, but it arises here in moral philosophy, too. In (Rozeboom 2018), I argue that we can appeal to the anti-inflammatory purpose to solve this problem.

an important part of what qualifies individuals as appropriate objects of respect for persons. They must have the capacities needed for sharing and helping to solve the problem of inflamed amour-propre.⁴¹ These capacities will overlap significantly with the rational and autonomous capacities prized by capacity-based views. But it remains that someone's role in the anti-inflammatory practice, and not their agential capacities, is the focus of respect for persons.

It becomes an important question, then, whether a role-based or capacity-based view of respect for persons is more plausible overall. I have laid the groundwork for developing a role-based view, starting with the aspect of respect for persons that such a view readily captures (and that have been underexplored by capacity-based views): the fact that respect for persons involves accepting the responsibilities, and not just authority, that persons have for their lives and interactions with one another. A role-based view requires an account of the social practice containing the relevant role, and for this, I have described a practice that helps solve the Rousseauian problem of inflamed amour-propre. And I have shown how the resulting Rousseauian role-based view can explain other important aspects of respect for persons, which have featured prominently in capacity-based views.

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⁴¹ And conversely, on Kant's own view, some of the tendencies that underlie the problem of inflamed amour-propre are an important part of what constitutes our humanity; see, e.g., Kant's discussion of our "predisposition" to humanity in the *Religion* (1996b: 6:27ff).

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